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protected because they are "in essence public." In support of this argument, it can
be said that the public interest in the suppression of cnime demands such a limita-
tion upon the right to privacy. But as has been observed, there are reasonable
alternatives which accomplish the same result without the dangers inherent m
giving the police license to search semi-public areas at will. In our society, the
fourth amendment represents a monument to the belief that individual privacy
is a paramount right. The Smayda decision seems to lose sight of the fact that
this amendment was intended to prevent abuse of the innocent in the process
of bringing law violators to justice. The words of Justice Douglas are apt:
This guarantee of protection against unreasonable searches and seizures extends
to the innocent and guilty alike. It marks the right of privacy as one of the unique
values of our civilization and, with few exceptions, stays the hands of the police
unless they have a search warrant issued by a magistrate on probable cause sup-
ported by oath or affirmation. 61
The Smayda decision is irreconciable with these principles, and it is therefore
submitted that the case is unsound.
Anthony D. Osmundson*
61 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948).
* Member, Second Year Class.
"TEAM VENTURES": Air Technology Corp. v.
General Electric Co.
The "weapon system contracting" concept, evolved by the Air Force following
World War II
is the governmental practice . of treating an entire weapon system, including
all subcontracts and accessory equipment, as a single unit, and giving a single
prime contractor or team the responsibility for the entire unit. In some instances
this may be modified by dividing the job into several segments and' designating
one prime contractor or team to be responsible for each segment.'
The Problem
The term "team," frequently encountered in the cant of the defense industries,
did not appear, in its defense-industry usage, in any reported case until 1964.
In Air Technology Corp. v. General Electrc Co.,2 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts was called upon to adjudicate a dispute among team members.
The Air Force, some time after 1957, undertook the 477 L project to establish
radiation monitoring stations to track the direction and yield of nuclear deto-
nations by methods including the use of electromagnetic (EM) sensors. Air
Technology (AT) had considerable experience in the detection of EM radiation,
lBergstrom, Antitrust Immunity or Exemption for Activities Involving Govern-
ment Contracts--Weapons Systems" and "Team Bidding," 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 433, 434
(1964). (Emphasis added.)
2347 Mass. 613, 199 N.E.2d 538 (1964).
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and in April, 1961, AT discussed the 477 L project with the Air Force, learning
of eight companies, including General Electric (GE), which had done some
preliminary work. AT communicated with all but one of these companies and
expressed willingness to contribute toward any proposal which that company
might submit to the Air Force.
In June, 1961, as a result of preliminary negotiations, GE and AT agreed to
submit a team proposal, and in October, responding to an Air Force request for
quotation on the 477 L system, GE submitted a proposal bearing on its covers
the names of GE, AT, and three other firms, containing data furnished in part
by AT. Early in November, GE was selected as prime contractor by the Air
Force-not on the basis of its proposal, but rather on a statement of its expected
performance. A contract was negotiated to become effective in February, 1962.
GE subsequently refused to negotiate a subcontract with AT as a team member
and built the EM sensor portion of the program itself, using in part the data
contributed by AT. AT brought an action in equity (1) to restrain the defendant
(GE) from using information supplied to it by AT, (2) to obtain a declaration
that GE had committed breaches of a fiduciary relation to AT, and (3) for
damages. The action was referred to a master, who found, among other things,
that AT and GE had agreed that AT would be a team member participating in
GE's proposal; that the use of the term "team" was more than a sales pitch; and
that AT was entitled to recover damages for GE's breach of the agreement to
negotiate with AT for a subcontract. Both parties appealed from the decree
awarding AT damages for breach of contract but refusing to enjoin the use by
GE of the data furnished by AT for the proposal.
The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the facts of Air Technology,
although msufficient to establish the creation of a joint venture due to the lack
of certain essential elements, were sufficient to create a "more limited joint under-
taking by GE and AT, as team members "3 While the court failed to discuss
in depth the relationship between team members, it based its finding of liability
upon GE's failure to perform its contractual responsibility as a team member.
AT's prayer for injunctive relief was denied because the project was important
to the national defense, and the court felt that with respect to this less formal
joint undertaking, substantial redress could be afforded by the payment of money
3 The court noted that "The use of the term 'team member' leads us to infer that
the parties intended a contractual association in some form of joint undertaking. The
master regarded this essentially as a ]oint venture. The subsidiary facts do not indicate
that GE and AT intended that the prime contract was to be a joint venture within that
indefinite term's ordinary usage. AT was to be only a subcontractor. There was to
be no such sharing in the profits of the prime contract, no such joint interest in particular
assets, and no such joint control of performance as would ordinarily exist in a ]oint
venture in the usual sense. There was, however, a more limited joint undertaking
by GE and AT, as team members, to obtain the prime contract for GE, with the
expectation that AT would obtain benefits as a subcontractor. In this undertakang certain
aspects of the usual ]oint venture did not appear. Nevertheless, both AT and GE made
substantial contributions to the team effort in time and expenditure and risked the
value to their preliminary work. Even if the arrangement did not constitute a typical
joint venture GE (as controling captain of the team] may be held to its contractual
responsibility to AT as a team member." Id. at 624-25, 199 N.E.2d at 546-47. (Emphasis
added.)
May, 19661 NOTES
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
damages without injunctive relief. For purposes of convenience, the "more limited
joint undertaking" as "team members" will be referred to hereafter as a "team
venture," although that term is used nowhere m the opinion of the court.
This note will be limited to two important questions raised by the case: first,
is the "team venture" analogous to a joint venture; 4 second, should the rights and
liabilities of the parties be governed by the substantive law of ]oint ventures?
Is the "Team Venture" Analogous to a joint Venture?
A team venture, as found by the court, is something less than a joint venture.5
Therefore, in order to define a team venture we must first define a ]oint venture.
It has been noted that the legal relationship known as a joint venture is a
comparatively recent creature of the American courts and is still in the process
of development, having no certain, satisfactory, all-inclusive definition or fixed
boundarnes.6 Each case must be considered on its own facts, giving consideration
to the usages and practices characteristic of the particular commercial under-
taking sought to be labeled a joint venture.7 The joint venture is contractual in
nature, and an agreement, either express or implied, is essential to its creation.8
Under this agreement, the parties must intend to create a joint venture; 9 however,
little formality is required, 10 and the conduct of the parties," as well as other
facts and circumstances, will often justify the inference of such intention.1 2 The
court in Air Technology stressed the contractual nature of a team venture and
indicated that a "contractual association" could be implied from the parties'
conduct.18
4 The court felt that it did not have to reach this question as it based liability on
breach of contract. Id. at 625 n.16, 199 N.E.2d at 547 n.16.
The court failed to find a joint venture because certain essential elements were
lacking. It found instead a more limited joint undertaking (a team venture). Therefore,
a team venture may be defined as a joint venture "less" certain essential elements. See
note 3 supra.
6 Davis v. Webster, 198 N.E.2d 883 (Ind. 1964). See generally Adkins, Gilpatnc,
& Abraham, Corporate Jont Ventures in Operation, 14 Bus. LAw. 285 (1959); Berle,
Developments in the Pattern of Corporate Joint Enterprise, 14 Bus. LAw. 309 (1959);
Jaeger, Joint Ventures: Origin, Nature and Development, 9 Am. U.L. REv. 1 (1960);
Jaeger, Joint Ventures: Membership, Types and Termination, 9 Am. U.L. REv. 111
(1960); Mechem, The Law of Joint Adventures, 15 MnxN. L. REv. 644 (1931); Mullen,
Joint Adventures, 8 MD. L. REv. 22 (1943); Nichols, Joint Ventures, 36 VA. L. REv.
425 (1950); Taubman, What Constitutes a Joint Venture, 41 CoiNELL L.Q. 640 (1956).
7 Accord, Frazell v. United States, 213 F Supp. 457 (W.D. La. 1963), reo'd on
other grounds, 335 F.2d 487, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1964).8 Accord, Richardson v. Walsh Constr. Co., 334 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1964); Ellison
v. Riddle, 166 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1964); Southwest Drayage Co. v. Crawford Moving
Vans, Inc., 377 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. 1964).
9 Accord, Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co., 192 Kan. 360, 388 P.2d 824 (1964);
Southwest Drayage Co. v. Crawford Moving Vans, Inc., supra note 8.
10 Weinstock v. L. A. Carpet, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 2d 809, 44 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1965).
1 Ellison v. Riddle, 166 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1964).
22 Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Ill. App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807 (1965).
13 As seen note 3 supra, the court found a "contractual association" between the
team members, and also noted that "What the parties intended is indicated by GE's
subsequent conduct," e.g., (1) listing AT in the letter of interest as a subcontractor,
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In addition to the requirement of a contractual basis, certain additional re-
quirements have traditionally been discussed by the courts in ascertaining whether
or not the joint venture relationslip exists in a particular case. These include:
(1) the mutual sharing of profits and losses resulting from the venture; (2) a
joint proprietary interest in the subject matter of the venture; and (3) the mutual
right of control or management of the venture. 14
The court in Air Technology found these traditional requirements lacking.
But liability was imposed upon GE on the basis -of a more limited joint under-
taking, which this note has called a team venture. Thus it would seem that,
relymg on Air Technology, a court could find a team venture present even though
the particular contractual association under consideration bore little resemblance
to a joint venture. It is submitted that this is incorrect. This note will show that
a team venture is practically analogous to a joint venture, so much so that the
same substantive law should be applied to both types of contractual associations.
Each of these traditional requirements will be considered separately to determine
whether or not there is a valid basis in established precedent upon wnch the
court in Air Technology could have concluded that the requirement was fulfilled
under the facts of that case. If there is such a basis, it follows that a joint venture
and a team venture should not be distinguished in regard to that requirement.
Contractual Relationship
It has been seen that a joint venture is contractual in nature, requiring an in-
tention of the parties to create a joint venture. It has also been seen that the
court in Air Technology inferred a contractual association between AT and GE
from their conduct. The court, in reaching the conclusion that there was no ]omt
venture between AT and GE, stressed the fact that AT was to receive a sub-
contract from GE. It is submitted that a joint venture is not precluded by the fact
that there is a subcontracting agreement between the joint venturers. One writer
has pointed out the fact that "on various types of construction jobs, prime con-
tractors and subcontractors are not infrequently associated on a joint venture
basis. That is, one contractor will obtain a contract for the entire operation and
then farm out various parts on a profit and loss arrangement."15
In Rosen v. E. C. Losch, Inc.,' 6 the court stated that the mere fact that an
agreement was captioned "subcontracting agreement" did not of itself show that
"team member," and the only potential source of the EM sensor; (2) designating
AT's personnel as "the only individuals having program responsibility in the EM
sensor field" (3) Hynes's [a GE employee] statements that showing AT as a second
tier subcontractor was a "mistake," and that it was GE's "intention that AT would
receive a sole source procurement for the EM sensor", (4) treating Dr. Clapp, Dr.
Hillger [AT employees], and AT's DASA contract as team assets in the proposal presenta-
tion; (5) GE's early treatment of AT's material as entitled to protection [from
another company]; (6) GE's assistance in and use of Dr. Clapp's research in the summer
of 1961, and (7) the absence of any suggestion to AT prior to December, 1961, that
other companies and (above all) GE, were to compete with AT [m AT's portion
of the system]. 347 Mass. at 624 n.12, 199 N.E.2d at 546 n.12.
14 See Jaeger, Joint Ventures: Origin, Nature and Development, 9 Am.. U.L. REv.
1 (1960), citing 2 WHLISTON, CoN' RcTs § 318A (3d ed. 1959) and cases cited thereto.
15 Jaeger, Joint Ventures: Membership, Types and Termination, 9 Am. U.L. REV.
111, 124 (1960).
16 234 Cal. App. 2d 324, 44 Cal. Rptr. 377 (1965).
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a joint venture was not contemplated by the parties thereto. The court reasoned:
"[I]t is the duty of the court to give effect to the intention of the parties where
it is not wholly at variance with the correct legal interpretation of the terms of
the contract, and a practical construction placed by the parties upon the instru-
ment is the best evidence of their retention."17 The court concluded that there
was a ]omt venture between the parties despite the fact that their agreement was
in the form of a subcontract.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in Ohio Builders' Supply Co.
v. Wetzel Constr. Co.,18 wherein one company agreed to aid another company in
obtaining a road construction contract from the State of West Virginia in return
for a subcontract for a portion of the work, noted that: "The supply company
comes into litigation, not as a subcontractor of the construction company,
but more strictly as a coadventurer with it in the undertaking."
It would seem at this point that the primary difference between the usual
prime contractor-subcontractor relationship and a joint venture or team venture
is the fact that in the former relationship there is no intent of the parties to com-
bine and act jointly, either as joint venturers (which is essential to a joint ven-
ture) or as a team (which is an essential element of a team venture). However,
if this intent to combine and act jointly is present, either a ]oimt venture or a team
venture may be present under the subcontracting agreement. Thus, the fact that
there was to be only a subcontracting agreement between AT and GE should
not be considered a valid factor in distingishing this contractual association
from a joint venture. The two relationships are analogous to the extent that either
may exist where there is a subcontracting agreement between the parties to the
ndertaking.
Profit Sharing
Although the parties to a joint venture need not share equally,19 or in the
same manner,20 it is generally stated that a mutual sharing in the profits of the
joint venture is essential to its existence. 21 Some jurisdictions have indicated that
profit sharing is not a controlling factor, even though it is included in the agree-
ment, but is merely to be considered among all of the other facts and circum-
stances.22 There is also dictum that the purpose of malang a direct profit is not
an essential element of the joint venture. 28 Many jurisdictions also require a shar-
ing of losses, although this was not mentioned by the court in Air Technology.24
17 Id. at 331, 44 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
18 108 W Va. 354, 151 S.E. 1 (1929).
19 Accord, Davis v. Webster, 198 N.E. 2d 883 (Ind. 1964).
20 Accord, Davidson v. Shaffer, 153 Kan. 661, 113 P.2d 90 (1941).
21 Accord, Fishback v. United States, 215 F Supp. 621 (D.S.D. 1963); Polikoff v.
Levy, 55 IMI. App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807 (1965); Bender v. Bender, 144 Mont. 470,
397 P.2d 957 (1965).22 First Mechanics Bank v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1937); U.S.
Fidelity & Guarantee Co. ex rel. Reedy v. American Surety Co., 25 F Supp. 280 (M.D.
Penn. 1938).
2 Chisholm v. Gilmore, 81 F.2d 120 (4th Cir. 1936).
24 See Holt v. Queen City Loan & Investment, Inc., 377 S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1965);
C. C. Roddy, Inc. v. Carlisle, 391 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. 1965); Robinson Transp. Co., Inc.
v. Hawkeye-Security Ins. Co., 385 P.2d 203 (Wyo. 1963). Contre, First Mechanics
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However, the court did stress, in concluding that there was no ]omt venture be-
tween AT and GE, that AT was not to share in the profits of the prume contract.
It has been urged that
AT's expected profit under the subcontract could be construed as a sufficient
share in the profits of the prime contract to warrant finding the relationship of
joint adventurers. The mode of participation "'in the fruits of the undertaking
may be left to the agreement of the parties" and they could arguably have chosen
the subcontract device as their method of sharring the profits.25
The traditional view, however, is that in a ]omt venture the profit must be joint.
There is no ]omt venture where the parties earn a several profit.2 6 It would thus
seem that the element of profit sharing is a valid distinguishing factor between
a ]omt venture and a team venture.
Therefore, the mutual undertaking of the parties may be classified as a joint
venture if there is a joint sharing of the profits of the prime contract, while the
undertaking should be classified as a team venture if each member of the under-
taking earns a several profit. In order to share jointly in the profits of the prime
contract, the parties must share directly in the profits of the prime contract per
se. This may anse in two situations: (1) where all of the members of the under-
taking are in pnvity of contract with the Government, i.e., where the contract is
let to the members jointly, and (2) where there is no privity of contract between
the Government and all of the members of the undertaking, as in the case of sub-
contractors, but all of the members are to receive a percentage of the profits of
the prime contract. In this latter situation, the subcontracting members of the
undertaking designate one member to act as prime contractor and to contract
with the government for the benefit of all of the members. The prime contractor
takes the contract as a constructive trustee for the other members, as m the
situation where one member of a joint venture, taking legal title to real or per-
sonal property for the benefit of the joint venture, is held to be a constructive
trustee of the property so held.2 7 If the parties to the undertaking do not share
jointly in the profits of the prime contract per se, either directly or on a percent-
age basis, the profit earned by each member is indirect and several; hence there
is a team venture. Indirect sharing in the profits of the prime contract will usually
exist under a subcontract, and it may be concluded, therefore, that in the normal
defense-industry situation, a team venture, not a joint venture, will be found
where there is a contractor-subcontractor relationship.28
Bank v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 275 (3d Cir. 1937); Fishback v. United States, 215
F. Supp. 621 (D.S.D. 1963); Stems v. Williams, 72 Idaho 276, 240 P.2d 833 (1952);
Tate v. Ballard, 243 Minn. 353, 68 N.W.2d 261 (1954); Las Vegas Mach. & Eng'r
Works v. Roemisch, 67 Nev. 1, 213 P.2d 319 (1950).
25 Note, 6 BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL & CommE.ncrArL L. REv. 331, 334 (1965).
2 6Accord, Swann v. Ashton, 330 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1964); United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 155 F Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
27 See Boxill v. BoxiU, 201 Misc. 386, 111 N.Y.S.2d 33 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
28 As has been seen, an indirect profit sharing precludes finding a joint venture.
Such indirect profit sharing will usually exist under a subcontracting agreement. If there
were no subcontracting agreement, and the parties were co-prime contractors, there
would be pnvity of contract between the parties and the Government, and the profit
would be direct. The interposition of the prime contractor between the subcontractor and
the government prevents this direct profit sharing from resulting; hence a "team venture"
is established.
NOTES
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Joint Proprietary Interest
Generally, in a joint venture there must be a joint proprietary interest in the
subject matter of the venture or property engaged theren. 29 The test for deter-
mining whether or not a joint proprietary interest exists sets forth two require-
ments.3 0 First, the parties must have ]oined their property, interests, skills, and
risks in such a manner that for the purpose of the venture their respective con-
tributions have become as one. To satisfy this requirement, however, "joint ad-
venturers do not have to be co-owners of the property used in the business of the
joint adventure; the property may be owned by only one of the joint adventurers
and its use only devoted to the purpose of the joint adventure."3 1 Second, the
commingled property and interests must be made subject to use by each of the
associates for their joint benefit. While the Air Technology court based its finding
of no jomt venture between AT and GE partly on the fact that there was no joint
interest in particular assets, the court found that: (1) GE treated Dr. Clapp, Dr.
Hillger (AT employees) and AT's DASA contract as team assets in the proposal
presentation to the Air Force; (2) at an earlier date GE had treated AT's data
as entitled to protection due to its proprietary nature; (3) GE had assisted in
and used Dr. Clapp's research in the summer of 1961, (4) both AT and GE
made substantial contributions to the team effort in time and expenditures and
risked the value of their preliminary work.32
The court could have concluded that tis conduct constituted a sufficient
joinder of skills, interests, and risks so that for the purpose of the particular ven-
ture AT's and GE's respective contributions became as one, thus fulfilling the
first requirement of the test. Both AT and GE had access to the data of the other
contained in the team proposal, so long as it was used for the purpose of the
venture, 3 thereby fulfilling the second requirement.
Since both requirements of the test have been fulfilled, it is submitted that
there were sufficient facts present to justify the court in finding a joint proprietary
interest in a particular asset, the team proposal. Under this analysis, there would
always be a joint proprietary interest in a team venture because the parties always
combine together and pool their individual assets, usually knowledge or skill, in
furtherance of the team objective. A joint proprietary interest, an essential ele-
ment, must always be present in a joint venture. Therefore, it follows that the
element of a joint proprietary interest should not be considered a distinguishing
factor.
29 Accord, Swann v. Ashton, 330 F.2d 995 (10th Cir. 1964); Richardson v. Walsh
Constr. Co., 334 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1964); Bender v. Bender, 144 Mont. 470, 397
P.2d 957 (1965).
3 0 Sadwith v. Lantry, 219 F Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
31 Hayes v. Muller, 245 La. 356, 158 So. 2d 191 (1963). Accord, In the matter of
Cadillac Oil Co., 227 F Supp. 397 (S.D. Cal. 1964); Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co.,
192 Kan. 360, 388 P.2d 824 (1964).
32 347 Mass. at 624 n.12, 625, 199 N.E.2d at 546 n.12, 547.
33 In fact, GE used the data of AT in developing its own prototype system. This
was one of the factors considered by the court in holding GE liable for breach of
contract, since the use of the data was outside the purpose of the venture. 347 Mass. at
625, 199 N.E.2d at 546.
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Joint Control
Generally, in a joint venture, the parties thereto must have a mutual right of
control of the venture.3 4 The court m Air Technology found no mutual right of
control between AT and GE. There is, however, authority for the proposition
that joint control, while a circumstance to be considered along with all of the
other surrounding facts and circumstances, is not an essential element of a joint
venture.3 5 It has also been suggested that consultation with the other members
of the ]oint venture is sufficient to establish the relationship,3 6 and it has been
clearly established that even though a joint venturer may entrust actual control
of the project to his co-venturer, the project will still remain a joint venture.37
The court in Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Bean,SS finding an implied entrusting of
control, noted:
In the instant case, the contract between O'Leary and the company did not
indicate that O'Leary had no right of control or no voice in the operations of the
enterprise. It did provide that actual control of the dismantling operations would
be in the company. We think this is merely the case where one of the parties
entrusted actual control to another, and that fact does not negative the holding
that there was a joint venture.3 9
Therefore, those jurisdictions which require joint control of the undertaking may
establish that element by applying the entrusting theory.
The language of Eagle Star applies equally well to Air Technology. In their
agreement, the parties did not indicate that AT was to have no control or voice
in the operation of the venture; however, they did agree'that GE was to be the
team captain with prime contract responsibilities (in other words, to have actual
control of the performance of the prime contract). Thus, there was an implied
entrusting by AT to GE of actual control of the team venture. Therefore, since
joint control must be present to find a joint venture, and can always be found to
be present in a team venture by application of the implied entrusting analysis,
the element of joint control of performance is not a distinguishing factor.
It must be concluded that the joint venture and the team venture are, to a
certain extent, analogous. Summarzed briefly, it may be said that:
(1) Both the joint venture and the team venture are contractual in nature,
requiring an intent to act jomtly.
34 Sadwith v. Lantry, 219 F Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Ill.
App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807 (1965); Holt v. Queen City Loan & Investment, Inc., 377
S.W.2d 393 (Mo. 1965); C. C. Roddy, Inc. v. Carlisle, 391 S.W.2d 765 (Tex. 1965).
3 5 See Seymour v. Wildgen, 137 F.2d 160 (10th Cir. 1943); Davidson v. Shaffer,
153 Kan. 661, 113 P.2d 90 (1941).36 Klemschmidt v. United States, 146 F Supp. 253 (D. Mass. 1956).
37 Accord, Rosen v. E. C. Losch, Inc., 234 Cal. App. 2d 324, 44 Cal. Rptr. 377
(1965); Wittner v. Metzger, 72 N.J. Super. 438, 178 A.2d 671 (1962). 30 Am. Jur.
Joint Adventures § 40 (1940) notes that: "The requisite of equality in joint control
does not render impossible the delegation of the duties of management to one of the
participants in a joint adventure. The rights of the parties with respect to the management
of the enterprise may be fixed by agreement and, once having been fixed, may be
changed by agreement, without doing violence to the requirement of joint control."
38 134 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1943).
39 Id. at 758.
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(2) Either a ]omt venture or a "team venture" may exist under a subcontract.
(3) The key distinction between a joint venture and a team venture is the
profit-sharing element. In the team venture profit sharing is indirect, with each
team member earning a several profit, while in the joint venture the profit sharing
is direct, with each ]omt venturer sharing jointly.
(4) A joint proprietary interest and ]oint control of performance are not dis-
tinguishmg factors. As essential elements, they must always be present in a ]oint
venture, and factually, they will always be present in a team venture, although
theoretically, not essential, according to Air Technology.
Having distinguished the joint venture from its shadow relation the "team
venture," and found that they are to a large extent analogous, we turn to the
second important question raised by the holding of the court in Air Technology.
Should the Rights and Liabilities of the Team Members Be Governed by the
Substantive Law of joint Ventures?
What are the purposes underlying the development and use of the jomt ven-
ture as a mode of conducting business? If the purposes for the development and
use of the team venture are identical, does it not follow that the same body of
substantive law should apply to both? The proposition that where two relation-
ships are similar in characteristics and purpose they should be governed by the
same general substantive law is not without precedent. An analogous situation
existed in the development of the substantive law of joint ventures. Historically,
joint ventures developed as a limited type of partnership.40 A traditional partner-
ship contemplated a continuing business association,41 while a ]oint venture has
been defined as a partnership for a limited purpose. 42 When the particular pur-
pose, such as the construction of a particular road or building, is accomplished
the joint venture is ended. It is quite understandable that the substantive law of
both relationships is quite saiilar,43 since the relationships are so smilar in nature.
One court, in applying this reasoning, has noted:
It seems to me that under the New Jersey law, the juridical concept, com-
monly called a joint venture, is graduated like a spectrum from a partnership
ad hoc through various forms of fiduciary business relationships into an agency
with contingent remuneration to the agent, as was the case here. Indeed, it
matters little what the precise definition of a ]omt venture may be for the
fiduciary relationship always arises from it, as it does from an agency, and the
remedial sequelae are of the same kind.44
One writer, in discussing the purposes of the joint venture, notes that one of
the basic underlying purposes in the development and recognition of the joint
40 Accord, Edlebeck v. Hooten, 20 Wis. 2d 83, 121 N.W.2d 240 (1963).
41 Accord, Fishback v. United States, 215 F Supp. 621 (D.S.D. 1963).
4 2 Accord, Sadwith v. Lantry, 219 F Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Anderson v.
Steurer, 391 S.W.2d 839 (Mo. 1965).
43Accord, Orlopp v. Willardson Co., 232 Cal. App. 2d 750, 43 Cal. Rptr. 125
(1965); Polikoff v. Levy, 55 Ill. App. 2d 229, 204 N.E.2d 807 (1965); Stncklin v.
Parsons Stockyard Co., 192 Kan. 360, 388 P.2d 824 (1964). See also Comment, 18
FoRDHAm L. REv. 114 (1949).
44 Cray, McFawn & Co. v. Hegarty, Conroy & Co., 27 F Supp. 93, 99 (S.D.N.Y.
1939).
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venture was the need to take advantage of the knowledge and specialized skills
of the members of the venture. 45 This also is the primary purpose of the "team
venture." For example, suppose that the X Company and the Y Company decide
to work together for the purpose of producing a new aircraft for the government.
The design of the aircraft calls for an entirely new concept m fabrication of the
airframe and an entirely new concept m the propulsion system. Since the X Com-
pany has prior experience in the field of propulsion, it is to have responsibility
for that phase of the aircraft, while the Y Company, having prior experience in
the airframe field, is to have responsibility for that phase. For either the X Com-
pany or the Y Company to have built both the propulsion system and the airframe
would not have been feasible, since neither had experience in the field of the
other. By working together, they can produce an excellent end product, at the
lowest possible cost to the Government. How should this "working together"
for the limited purpose of producing the aircraft be classified? One writer 46 has
suggested that there are three alternative methods of contracting with the
Government:
(1) The 'Ture Weapon System" procurement method, by which centralized
control of the design, development, and production is obtained by making the
prime contractor the responsible focal point for consolidation of all efforts. For
example: "Convair was given a contract for development of the B-58 supersomc
bomber, with power to subcontract, but with the Air Force exercising authority
over the choice of subcontractors in the light of their ability and background."47
(2) The "Associate Primes" procurement method, where instead of a single
prime contractor, there are selected a number of major associate primes, each of
whom is responsible for a complete subsystem. For example:
In the case of the Atlas missile, Convair manufactured the anframe and was also
responsible for testing and integration of the entire system. Rocketdyne of North
American Aviation produced the engines. General Electnc's Defense System
Department manufactured the radio-inertial guidance system, and American
Bosch Anma was responsible for later all-inertial guidance. General Electnc's
Missile and Space Vehicle Department had charge of the re-entry vehicle.48
(3) The "Team" method of procurement, wherein a major prime contractor
will team up with a number of subcontractors and submit a team bid on the
entire system. For example: "In the case of the Dyna-Soar system, major con-
tractors (Boeing and Martin) teamed up with a number of subcontractors and
4 5
"In spite of the tremendous growth of corporations in the United States, the
joint venture has, in recent years, been utilized for purposes very similar to those which
brought about its development historically. Individuals, co-partnerships and even
corporations have joined or attempted to join in what they have called joint ventures
for purposes of pooling capital and carrying out large industrial and financial projects
In other instances the resources of an individual contractor may be adequate
for him to perform and finance the contract, but the job may be one involving types
of construction, with some of which the individual contractor may not have had
experience. Where such a condition exists other contractors who have had the neces-
sary experience may be brought in and the job undertaken as a joint venture." Nichols,
Jont Ventures, 36 VA. L. REv. 425, 428-29 (1950).
46 Bergstrom, supra note 1, at 436-37.
47 Id. at 436.
48 Id. at 429.
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submitted bids on the entire weapon system. In that case, final contract award
was made to both teams, with one team being awarded the contract for the air-
frame and the other the contract for the booster."49 (Perhaps this variation forms
a fourth category which could be designated the "Associate Team Method.")
Under this classification of government procurement methods, the "Pure
Weapon System" method is not a joint undertaking at all since there is no inten-
tion of the parties to combine m any other manner than contractor and sub-
contractor. It has been seen that in order to have either a joint venture of a team
venture there must be an intent to combine either as joint venturers or as team
members.
The "Associate Primes" method should be characterized as a joint venture
because there is a direct sharing of the profits of the prime contract per se. The
contract is let to them jointly, and each Associate is in privity of contract with
the Government; hence a joint profit is earned. As has been seen, the element of
profit sharing is the key distinguishmg factor between a joint venture and a "team
venture."
The "team" method offers two alternatives, depending upon the agreement
of the parties in setting up the "team." If the parties agree that each member
is to share in a percentage of the profits of the prime contract per se, but under
the subcontract, not all members are in pnvity of contract with the Government,
there would be direct profit sharing, the profits would be joint, and the relation-
ship should be classified as a joint venture, assuming that all of the other requisite
elements are present. If, on the other hand, there is no sharing m the profits of
the prime contract per se on a percentage basis, each team member would earn
a several profit, and a team venture would be established.
Whether the X Company-Y Company combination referred to earlier is a
joint venture or a "team venture" depends upon two factors. First, was there a
subcontracting agreement between the parties? If not, the combination should be
characterized as an "Associate Primes" agreement, and as seen above, should be
classified as a joint venture. If there was a subcontracting agreement between
the parties, the combination could be either a joint venture or team venture,
depending upon whether there was a joint profit or a several profit earned by
the Compames. If a joint profit was earned, the relationship should be classified
as a joint venture. If a several profit was earned, the relationship should be
classified as a team venture.
The most important result of extending the substantive law of joint ventures
to team ventures would be that the requirement that the members act in the
utmost good faith in their relations with each other would be applicable. The
traditional joint undertaking is fiduciary in nature and imposes upon all the par-
ticipants the obligation of loyalty to the joint concern and the utmost good faith
in their dealings with each other with respect to matters pertaining to the enter-
prise.5 0 As a result of this requirement of good faith, equitable relief is always
available between the parties to a joint venture51 and should be available to team
members. This equitable relief generally takes two forms: injunctive relief to
49 Id. at 437.
50 Memhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
51 Chapman v. Dwyer, 40 F.2d 468 (2d Cir. 1930).
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prevent breaches of this fiduciary relationship, and an accounting of profits52
earned by the joint undertaking. In Air Technology, injunctive relief was demed
because, the court reasoned, the interests of national defense required the utili-
zation of AT's data. It is submitted that this result was reached entirely indepen-
dent of any considerations of the nature of the undertaking. It is based entirely
upon the fact that AT, through its dealings with GE and other compaies, had
lost its right to have the data protected since it had failed to protect the propn-
etary nature of the data by affixing the proper proprietary designation to the
data. An accounting was not possible under the facts of Air Technology, in the
absence of an extension of the substantive law of joint ventures, because the
court found no joint venture.
The extension of the substantive law of joint ventures to team ventures would
also allow legal relief in proper cases. One ]oint venturer may sue another at law
for damages. For example, where a member of a joint venture has been injured
by Ins associates' breach of contract 53 (as was the case in Air Technology), fraud
or deceit,5 4 or conversion to his own use of the joint property or some part of
%55 and the amount of plaintiffs claim is capable of ascertainment and compu-
tation by a jury,56 he may bring an action at law to redress his grievance.
It cannot be disputed that these protective remedies, applicable to joint ven-
tures, are equally necessary in a team venture relationship to protect the members
from abuses of the fiduciary relationship resulting from the joint undertaking. It
is submitted that this reason alone should be enough to bring about an extension
of the substantive law of joint ventures to their shadow relation, the team venture.
Concluston
In conclusion, it is submitted that the substantive law of joint ventures should
be applied to team ventures. The only real distinction between the two relation-
ships is the profit-sharing element. The major reason that this factor should not
result in a different treatment is that the purposes of the two relationships are
identical. Also, the team venture members need the protection of the fiduciary
principles that are applied to joint ventures.
William M. Flenniken, Jr.*
52 Sadwith v. Lantry, 219 F Supp. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
5 3 Barlin v. Barlin, 145 Cal. App. 2d 390, 302 P.2d 457 (1956).
54 Hey v. Duncan, 13 F.2d 794 (7th Cir. 1926).
5 Miller v. Rau, 216 Cal. App. 2d 68, 30 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1963).
56 Mitchell v. Reolds Farms Co., 268 Mich. 301, 256 N.W 445 (1934).
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